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" …… development of greater economic stakes in each other (i.e., SAARC economies) 
……would pave the way for more ambitious, but entirely achievable, goals such as free 
trade area and economic union, open borders and common currency for the region."  
 
India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee at the 12
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Until the recent adoption of the Euro, many economists were highly skeptical that 
a bloc of countries would agree to give up their sovereign currencies and independent 
monetary policy instrument. The introduction of the new currency on January 1, 2002 
dispelled lingering doubts about the reality of a monetary union. In fact, there is much 
interest in whether Europe’s monetary union could act as a role model for the other 
regions in the world, such as North America, the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), or West Africa. The focus of this study is on South Asia, a region that has 
been neglected by previous research. As Rose (2001) said, “academics should be trying 
to get policy-makers to raise monetary union to the level of national debate,” this paper is 
my contribution towards that effort for South Asia.  
The Asian Crisis of 1997 didn’t seem to affect South Asia much, partly as a result 
of low capital mobility, which insulated these economies from capital outflows. Yet, this 
insulation from the crisis has come at a very high cost to these countries. Inward-looking 
policies have stifled the enormous potential for growth in South Asia. Rose (2000) has 
shown that countries using a common currency trade significantly more (3 times), 
controlling for other factors. Successful expansion of trade within the region could also 
advance an understanding of the benefits of export-led growth, and promote further steps 
toward trade liberalization. The aim of this paper is to see if South Asia could form a 
monetary union and enjoy the benefits from a single currency.  
On December 5, 1985, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka formed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
Cooperation was sought in economic, social, scientific and cultural areas. For much of   3
the time since the formation of SAARC, the benefits of association have not been tapped 
because of internal and external conflicts within and between member states, rigid and 
inflexible economic policies, extensive bureaucracy, and rampant corruption. However, 
the situation is improving and the nations are committed to promoting regional 
cooperation. They are seeking to reduce political, military and economic tensions, expand 
trade, take measures to eliminate poverty and protect the environment, and improve 
cultural links that exist among the South Asian states.
1 The goal to move towards more 
economic integration and ultimately towards a common currency in South Asia was 
emphasized by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Vajpayee, in January 2004. The 
commitment towards economic integration through free trade agreement has also been 
evident in the Twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad on January 4-6, 2004.
2 In 
addition to regional cooperation, some countries are promoting bilateral cooperation to 
expedite the process. For example, India and Sri Lanka have been engaged in bilateral 
trade agreements in order to have free trade by 2005. It is hoped that through economic 
cooperation, the political tensions in the region could be reduced.
3  
Before I proceed with the paper, certain questions beg some discussion: Should 
the countries proceed with this monetary union in the EU-style? I feel that the union 
should proceed in the EU-style – encouraging factor mobility and trade integration. Then 
the following path can be taken to the monetary union (Mundell 1997): First, there should 
be a commitment to fix the exchange rate with a credible mechanism of adjustment. 
Second, there should be an establishment of tight monetary arrangements, like those that 
exist in a currency-board system with an irrevocable commitment to the parity. Third, the 
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refer to Dutta (1999, pp 276). 
2 See http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php for details.    4
national currency should be replaced by the common (possibly the partner) currency. Of 
course, to pursue the EU-style economic integration, South Asia has some way to go. 
However, as mentioned above, bilateral trade agreements among countries are 
encouraging. Additionally, trade can be encouraged through fixing the exchange rates 
credibly. If currencies fluctuate persistently, it could lead to competitive depreciation and 
exchange dumping, which could hinder the operation of a Single Market. Evidently, as 
regional trade initiatives grow, there will be an “increasing need to buttress economic 
integration with monetary integration in other parts of the world, as there has been in 
Europe,” (Eichengreen, 1997, pp 265). Rose (2001) forcibly argues that the benefits of 
monetary unions and single currency are understated. Rose (2000) finds that a pair of 
countries in a monetary union seems to have substantially higher bilateral trade, holding a 
host of other factors constant. Even in a survey on the effect of common currency on 
international trade, Rose and Stanley (forthcoming) document that most studies find that 
currency unions raise trade a lot. Hence, no matter what, the move towards a single 
currency assumes even more significance when countries want more economic 
integration through trade.  
Why do we need a common currency when the same level of integration could 
also be achieved through policy coordination—like between Canada and the United 
States or Switzerland and Germany? The movement to a common currency is a legitimate 
recognition of political commitment to ensuring regional integration, hence it might be 
desirable in the SAARC region (where political incentives have outweighed economic 
incentives to establish peace and stability which is crucial for growth in that region). 
Even for Europe, the political economy wisdom dictated that to avoid exchange rate 
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fluctuations and sustain political support for internal market, the move to a common 
currency was inevitable (Eichengreen 1997, 324). The same would be true for South 
Asia. Yet, for South Asia, the goal of the union is not necessarily to become an 
international currency and be competitive against the dollar and the euro. The common 
currency can lead to a large increase in real income by boosting trade (Frankel and Rose 
2000). The major benefit of this union, however, will accrue in terms of peace that the 
union can bring, which will enhance growth in the region. This sentiment was echoed by 
Pakistan’s president, Mr. Musharraf, on his visit to India on April 17, 2005, "We want 
people in my country, Pakistan, and your country, India, to prosper. This can only be 
done through peace." 
This paper seeks to answer the question: “Could the seven countries that comprise 
SAARC form an optimal currency area (OCA)?” There has been no study that has 
systematically analyzed this possibility for this region. In light of the literature on OCA, 
this paper looks at the trade relationships, economic structure, labor mobility and the 
shocks affecting this area in order to examine the feasibility of a common currency. Since 
economic criteria are not the only determinants in the decision to move to a single 
currency, the paper also examines some geo-political factors that are important in this 
process. In addition, this paper also seeks to find similarities and differences with the 
European Union and ASEAN countries. 
Since Mundell’s (1961) and McKinnon’s (1963) seminal work on OCA, 
researchers have focused on four inter-relationships between the countries that would 
impinge on the benefits of adopting a common currency, namely: 
1.  Extent of trade: If potential members of a union trade a lot with each other, monetary 
union would reduce transaction costs.   6
2.  Nature of disturbances: If the countries experience similar shocks, the cost of giving 
up monetary policy independence would decrease.
4 
3.  Degree of labor mobility: High labor mobility across borders can be a useful 
mechanism for adjusting to asymmetric shocks that lead to high unemployment in a 
subset of the members of the union. 
4.  Fiscal transfers: If region-specific shocks prevail, a federal fiscal system would 
provide regional insurance (in the form of federally funded unemployment insurance 
benefits), thereby attenuating the impact of regional shocks on interregional income 
differentials.  
Empirical studies  
Some empirical studies suggest that a monetary union confers substantial benefits 
to trade. Rose (2000), in a cross-sectional study, shows that two countries that share the 
same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies. Glick 
and Rose (2001), in a time-series cross-sectional study, find that bilateral trade rises/falls 
by about 100% as a pair of countries forms/dissolves a currency union, ceteris paribus. 
Frankel and Rose (2000) use economic and geographic data to show that belonging to a 
currency union more than triples trade with each of the members of the zone. They also 
find that every 1% increase in trade (relative to GDP) raises income per capita by roughly 
1/3
rd of a percent over twenty years. Hence, their results support the hypothesis that the 
beneficial effects of currency unions on economic performance come through the 
promotion of trade, rather than through a commitment to non-inflationary monetary 
policy, or other macroeconomic influence. Rose and Engel (2002) find that members of 
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across countries could obstruct monetary union. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) enlist some caveats 
about implications of loss of policymaking in case of formation of a monetary union.    7
international currency unions tend to experience more trade and less volatile exchange 
rates. 
The empirical literature also investigates the relationship between business cycles 
synchronization and currency unions. Rose and Engel (2002) also find that business 
cycles are more tightly synchronized for members of a currency union than between 
countries with sovereign currencies, but not as much as regions of a single country. Being 
a member of a common currency area increases international business cycle correlation 
by perhaps 0.1, an economically significant amount. Frankel and Rose (1996, 1997) 
argue that international trade patterns and international business cycle correlations are 
endogenous. Using 30 years of data for 20 industrialized countries, they find that 
countries with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles. It 
follows that countries are more likely to satisfy the criteria for entry into a currency union 
after taking steps toward economic integration than before (Lucas critique).
5 On the other 
side of the debate are Paul Krugman and Martin Feldstein, who argue that economic 
integration would make business cycles more asynchronized as the economies would 
become more and more specialized. Rose and Engel (2002) do find that members of 
common currency areas tend to be more specialized. 
Using the criteria set out by this literature, this paper looks at the possibility of an 
OCA for the SAARC region. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
investigates the basic statistics of the SAARC countries. Section 3 describes the empirical 
                                                           
5 Expectations are likely to be important to many aggregate variables, and changes in policy are likely to 
affect those expectations. As a result, shifts in policy can change aggregate relationships. In short, if 
policymakers attempt to take advantage of statistical relationships, effects operating through expectations 
may cause relationships to break down. This is the famous Lucas critique (Romer, 2001, pp 275). In the 
case of currency unions, countries are more likely to increase trade after the adoption of common currency 
rather than before, since the adoption of common currency would reduce the exchange rate risk. This   8
methodology. Section 4 discusses the potential of a currency union in case of SAARC. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF SAARC NATIONS 
A similar level of economic development is crucial among potential members of a 
currency area in order to facilitate economic integration. A similar average level of 
education, skill and productivity of the work force would help moderate the flow of labor 
across borders, which could otherwise put social and fiscal strains on the immigrant 
country.
6 Entry into a monetary union leaves fiscal policy as the only macroeconomic 
tool for stabilization purposes. Therefore, fiscal policy should not be unduly strained by 
differences in social and economic structures. For example, the SAARC countries exhibit 
a similar population age structure (Table 1). The demographic statistics point out that 
these countries are not likely to face an aging problem anytime soon, which could 
otherwise put pressure on fiscal resources and threaten the existence of the union. If 
countries are at a similar level of development, there would be lower pressure to transfer 
funds from richer to poorer nations.  
The structure of production is reasonably similar across the SAARC countries. 
The industrial sector constitutes roughly a fourth of GDP in all countries, and 
manufacturing sector comprises about 10-15% of GDP for all, except Maldives, where 
tourism assumes importance. A similarity of economic structure may make them 
vulnerable to similar shocks, which could require a similar policy response. The 
Herfindahl index (Table 5) shows that most of the countries are specialized. Since this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
caveat should be kept in mind. A mere look at historical data may not be the best guide, but still it provides 
a rough idea as to the suitability of a country for an OCA.    9
specialization is in production of similar goods for exports (Table 6), the case for a 
common currency is strengthened on the grounds of similar shocks.
7 All the SAARC 
countries are fairly open to trade, but further liberalization and intraregional trade may 
be needed in order to gain the benefits of low transaction costs and elimination of 
exchange rate risk that accrue from using a common currency. 
Solid macroeconomic policies and performances are also required for countries in 
a potential monetary union in order to prevent a poor performer from imposing 
externalities on the union. Most of the members of SAARC currently have average 
inflation rates in single digits, low budget and current account deficits. While external 
debt varies from 20% (India) to 55% (Sri Lanka) of GDP, it appears sustainable for all 
countries since the share of short-term debt is small and the level of foreign exchange 
comfortable for most of the countries. A burgeoning external debt may pose a significant 
cost to the union by increasing sovereign default risk and widening interest rate spreads.  
 
COMPARING SAARC WITH OTHER GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS 
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of growth and inflation.
8 The 
table illustrates the high rates of growth achieved in East Asia and the high levels of 
inflation in Latin America. The standard deviations suggest significant regional 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 While the movement between high and low skilled workers could be complementary, one must recognize 
that economic strains could increase if immigration is in the same skilled category.  
7 Thanks are due to Richard Hooley, who brought out the fact that because of production of similar goods, 
they may not increase trade with each other as much. This argument assumes that much of the trade is 
inter-industry. Even if countries produce similar goods, there exists a huge potential for intra-industry trade. 
In addition, there is an immense amount of illegal trade in other commodities that takes place among these 
countries (refer Taneja 2001), which can be made legal once they recognize an economic union as the final 
goal—of which free trade zone and customs union is just the beginning. In addition, the formation of a 
currency union would bring peace and stability in the region, which is also crucial for growth. 
8 Since these growth rates are changes in the logarithm of output and GDP deflator, a value of 0.01 
represents a change of roughly 1%.    10
differences, with Europe displaying the most stable growth and inflation rates.
9 However, 
in this regional context, SAARC region has the second highest growth rate (after East 
Asia) and growth stability (after Western Europe). This region also scores the same on 
inflation rate with East Asia. Why this might be important? Stable growth and low 
inflation encourage investment and savings, attract FDI and facilitate macroeconomic 
policy-making.  
While stability of growth and inflation is important, a positive correlation of 
growth and inflation for the SAARC region (Table 3) would suggest that the countries 
may be cyclically synchronized. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) find some country 
groups with positive correlation for output but not inflation in case of Western Europe, 
and an opposite grouping for East Asia. Latin American countries depict a positive 
correlation for output with the United States and a negative correlation for inflation. 
Canada and the United States exhibit positive correlation for both output and inflation. 
According to these simple correlations, the SAARC economies display many positive 
correlations in output (52%), CPI inflation (95%) and GDP deflator inflation (71%).   
In addition to these simple correlations of output and prices, we turn to an 
investigation of the degree of correlation in underlying supply and demand disturbances. 
The following section describes the empirical methodology used for that analysis.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In order to examine the nature of the shocks affecting the SAARC countries, we 
employ the procedure developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and extended by 
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from 1977-1999.   11
Bayoumi (1992) to identify demand and supply shocks affecting real GNP. In Blanchard-
Quah’s model, demand side shocks have no long run effect on output, due to the natural 
rate hypothesis, while productivity shocks have a permanent effect on output. Since there 
is no unique way to decompose the series in a univariate framework, Blanchard and Quah 
use output and unemployment in their VAR to decompose real GNP. Bayoumi (1992) 
develops a similar model but uses prices instead of unemployment. He argues that since 
unemployment would be expected to move in the same way in response to both demand 
and supply shocks, the implied overidentifying restrictions would have somewhat less 
power than if prices are used. 
The basic framework is as follows
10. Suppose the true model can be represented 
by an infinite moving average of a (vector) of variables  Xt  and an equal number of 
shocks εt (where L is the lag operator and A represents a matrix of impulse response 
functions of the shocks to the elements of X).  
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Bayoumi (1992) uses output and prices in estimating supply and demand shocks. 
The framework implies that while supply shocks have permanent effects on the level of 
output, demand shocks have only temporary effects (both have permanent effects on the 
level of prices). Let  Xt  consist of a change in real output and a change in prices. Let εt 









































    





                                                           
10 See Blanchard and Quah (1989), Bayoumi (1992) and Enders (1995) for details on this framework.    12
where  ε ε st dt  and    are  independent  supply and demand shocks. In theory, only supply 
shocks affect real output in the long run, while demand shocks have only a temporary 
effect.  Since real output is written in first-difference form, the cumulative effect of 
demand shocks on the change in real output must be zero. This puts the following 
restriction on the model: 
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Since the elements of X are covariance stationary (represented by the infinite 
moving average process in 1), they can be represented by an autoregressive process by 
inverting the MA operator. Hence, this model can be estimated using a vector auto 
regression (VAR), where all the variables are potentially endogenous and hence are 
regressed on their lags. Let B represent the estimated coefficients, the VAR can be 
written as: 
(4) 
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where et represents the residuals from the equations in the VAR. 
In order to transform equation (4) into the model defined by (2) and (3), we need 
to transform the residuals from VAR (et) into supply and demand (εt). Writing et=Cεt, 
in this two by two case, we require four restrictions to define the four elements of the 
matrix C. Two restrictions come from normalization of the variance of supply and 
demand shocks. Another one comes from orthogonality of the two structural shocks.  
The final restriction comes from the fact that demand shocks have only temporary 
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This restriction allows the matrix C to be uniquely defined and the supply and demand 
shocks to be identified.  
This econometric methodology is used to estimate supply and demand shocks. 
Then, a pair-wise correlation matrix is computed for each type of shock to examine their 
symmetry across countries, which is essential in determining the readiness of a country to 
enter the union. A positive correlation of supply shocks signals that countries would 
require a synchronous policy response, which is crucial as the countries entering the 
union have to accept a common monetary policy. Highly related demand shocks may be 
less important, as they may stem from divergent monetary policies, which would no 
longer occur after monetary union. 
 
4: DO SAARC COUNTRIES HAVE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS TO FORM 
AN OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA? 
CRITERION 1: INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
The literature on OCA emphasizes trade as the main channel through which 
benefits from a common currency will be enjoyed. Hence, if countries trade a lot with 
each other, they are likely to benefit from low transaction costs and elimination of 
exchange rate risks. Before moving towards a full monetary union, the member countries 
may want to form a custom union. It is well-known that custom union could lead to trade 
creation (when there is a shift in the geographic location of production from higher-cost 
to lower-cost member) or trade diversion (when there is a shift in the locus of production 
of formerly imported goods from a lower-cost nonmember state to a higher-cost member   14
nation). Since a currency union just reduces costs of trade within the region – as such it 
should be welfare-enhancing  as the old patterns of trade are still available to the 
countries. Furthermore, econometric evidence suggests that countries in currency unions 
trade more with everyone, not just their union partners.
11 Hence, the move to a currency 
union is more likely to lead to trade-creation.  
Table 4a depicts the openness of the SAARC economies. All the countries show a 
big increase in the openness index between 1975 and 2003. Currently, the index varies 
between 20% (India) and 65% (Sri Lanka and Bhutan). After experiencing a balance of 
payments crisis in 1991, India embarked on a trade liberalization drive, but remains the 
most closed economy in the SAARC region. But India’s openness index is comparable to 
Germany’s. One must recognize that India has a huge domestic market, hence trade 
forms a substantially smaller percentage of GDP, especially when compared with East 
Asian economies, that are small and essentially require trade for growth. The rest of the 
countries are fairly open to trade, with Sri Lanka topping the chart.  
Intra-regional trade in South Asia (Table 4b) shows significant variation, with 
India and Pakistan trading the least with South Asia (3% in 2000) and Nepal the most 
(35% in 2000). Such intra-regional trade figures are much higher for the euro area and 
ASEAN. However, these figures might not be very representative of the total actual trade 
that takes place among these countries because of very high illegal trade among SAARC 
countries. For example, the magnitude of formal and informal trade between Bangladesh 
and India is roughly the same, while informal trade forms almost a third of the value of 
formal trade between India and Sri Lanka (Taneja (2001, 2002)). Estimates on illegal 
                                                           
11 From the discussion in a conference; available via the internet:  
http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/2001/wyplosz_discussion.pdf   15
trade between India and Pakistan vary from $100 million to $1 billion per year. The 
proportion of intra-SAARC trade (as a percentage of total SAARC trade with the world) 
increased from 4.46% to 6.48% for the year 1999 once unofficial trade was accounted for 
(South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2001/2, 2002).  
Still, with the present figures, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal trade a lot within the 
SAARC region. In fact, the share of trade with India for Bhutan and Nepal is about 75% 
and 40%, respectively. This is not surprising, given the free trade treaty that has existed 
between India and Bhutan since 1949 and a nearly free trade treaty between India and 
Nepal since 1996
12. With SAFTA and SAPTA talks progressing, we are likely to see an 
increase in official  trade among these countries.
13 Hassan (2001) suggests that more 
liberalization is required in order to reap benefits from an economic bloc. India has 
shown its keenness on reducing non-tariff barriers with the other SAARC countries. 
Hence, on August 1, 1998, India unilaterally removed quantitative restrictions on imports 
from SAARC countries, viz, Bangladesh, Bhutan Nepal, and Maldives, Sri Lanka or 
Pakistan subject to the condition that they comply with the rules of origin principles as 
stated in the SAARC agreement (Taneja 2001). 
In addition, as noted in the literature described earlier, trade is endogenous. Once 
a common currency has been adopted, more trade and greater synchronization of business 
cycles can occur than before entry. However, unlike Frankel and Rose (2000), who argue 
that gains come only through trade, we feel that the process of formation of an economic 
union would no doubt enhance trade, but will definitely ease political tensions that exist 
between India and Pakistan.  
                                                           
12 Except alcohol, tobacco and cosmetics. 
13 See South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2001/2, 2002, for approaches adopted by the South 
Asian countries to increase economic cooperation through trade.    16
 
CRITERION 2: NATURE OF DISTURBANCES AFFECTING SAARC  
Specialization: A highly specialized production and export structure could 
suggest that the country could be vulnerable to shocks arising from input costs and 
demand in its area of specialization. We compute the Herfindahl index, a measure of 
specialization for each country. This index is the sum of squared shares of the individual 
















where  xijt denotes the exports for country i of SITC subgroup j in year t,  Xit  denotes 
total exports for i in year t. H is bounded by (0,1]; a high value of H indicates that the 
country is specialized in the production of a few goods.  
We calculate this index for 5 out of 7 SAARC economies for which data was 
available and compare it with the mean computed by Rose and Engel (2002) for currency 
union and non-currency union members. The average of Herfindahl indices for SAARC 
countries is equal to the average for members of currency unions (Table 5). Indices for 
India and Sri Lanka are slightly lower than those of other countries, implying that they 
are somewhat more diversified. It is quite evident from Table 5 that most of the SAARC 
countries are specialized in the production of few goods. If specialization is in the same 
goods, this in fact could be taken as an argument to use a common currency since they 
will be affected by similar shocks. Table 6 shows that textiles, garments, or cotton fabrics 
are the major exports of most of the SAARC economies. Hence, these countries are more   17
likely to experience symmetric external shocks.
14 While production of similar goods 
could prohibit inter-industry trade, it will likely encourage intra-industry trade.
15 For 
example, Cerra, et al (2005) show that while India and China both have comparative 
advantage in producing textiles and clothing, India is relatively better at producing 
textiles and China in clothing. Hence, the two economies could benefit if China imports 
textile material from India in order to produce clothing for export.  
Correlation of supply and demand shocks: Using the methodology outlined in 
the previous section, we estimate the structural VAR model on annual data for all the 
seven countries (see appendix 2 for data sources).
16 Two lags are chosen for the VAR in 
order to capture the business cycles. The estimated results for supply and demand shocks 
are presented in tables 7 and 8.
17  
Tables 7a, 7b and 7c report the correlation of supply and demand shocks among 
the SAARC countries. While the estimated correlation coefficients of supply shocks 
ranged between –0.39 and 0.68 for Western Europe, -0.16 and 0.71 for East Asia, and –
0.59 and 0.72 for the Americas (Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994)), the correlation 
coefficients for South Asia range between –0.41 and 0.29 (for entire sample) and between 
-0.68 and 0.53 (from 1995-2003). For the entire sample, about 1/3
rd correlations are 
positive, but this number increases to about 50% for the more recent time period (1995-
                                                           
14 See Majumdar and Chakraborty (2001) for analysis of production structures of the SAARC countries. 
They find strong similarity of production structures between India and Pakistan (and limited one for 
Bangladesh).  
15 The geo-political section discusses particular goods in which intra-regional trade can be encouraged.  
16 Annual data was used in order to make this study comparable to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). 
Standard unit root tests (not presented in the paper) indicate that the series are non-stationary in levels, but 
stationary in first differences for all series, except for the first difference of CPI for Maldives and Pakistan. 
Since research indicates that unit root tests of economic variables suffer from lack of power, when a series 
is stationary, but highly correlated, rejection of the unit root hypothesis requires a considerably longer 
sample period that is typically available—which seems to be the case here. 
17 Since our main interest in this empirical exercise is to extract the supply and demand shocks, we exclude 
the analysis of impulse response functions and variance decompositions to conserve space.   18
2003). In fact, Sri Lanka and Pakistan seem to display positive and stronger correlations 
with India in the recent times. 
The correlation coefficients for demand shocks ranged from -0.21 to 0.65 for 
Western Europe, -0.39 to 0.7 for East Asia and –0.45 to 0.7 for the Americas (Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1994)), the range for South Asia is –0.3 to 0.57. The table shows that 
81% of the correlations are positive.    
Size of disturbances and speed of adjustment: The typical size of disturbances 
is another important economic characteristic since larger disturbances can have very 
disruptive effects, and may require policy independence (e.g., monetary policy) to offset 
them. Similarly, if the speed with which the economies adjust to disturbances is slow, 
then the cost of fixing the exchange rate and losing policy autonomy increases.  
In order to assess the size of disturbances, we use the long-run effect on output 
from the impulse response functions for the size of supply shocks and the sum of the first 
year’s impact on output and prices for the demand shocks. For the speed of adjustment, 
we estimate the response after two years as a share of the long run effect (following 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994)). 
Table 8 displays the size and the speed of adjustment for supply and demand 
disturbances for different geographic regions.
18 The SAARC economies experience the 
smallest supply disturbances compared to the other regions. The demand disturbance is 
larger than  Western Europe’s but smaller than East Asia and the Americas. The speed of 
adjustment is fastest for demand disturbances and ranks second for supply disturbances 
after East Asia. Almost all the adjustment to the disturbances is completed within two 
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Eichengreen (1994) for comparison.   19
years. Within the SAARC region, adjustment to demand disturbances is fastest in Bhutan 
and slowest in Maldives (where only 50% of the adjustment is completed within the first 
two years). However, Maldives has the fastest adjustment to supply disturbances, while 
Pakistan is the slowest in responding to supply shocks (only 61% of the adjustment is 
completed within the first two years).  
 
CRITERION 3: LABOR MOBILITY  
Labor mobility has been emphasized in the optimum currency area literature as it 
helps the members of a monetary union to adjust to asymmetric shocks by allowing labor 
to move from areas of high unemployment to low unemployment. Labor mobility varies 
across the SAARC region, but there is, unfortunately, scant official data on labor 
mobility. While labor is perfectly mobile between India and Nepal, there is very little 
mobility between India and Pakistan. Bangladesh has a very porous border with India that 
results in a substantial, but mostly illegal, flow of labor from Bangladesh to India. Legal 
hurdles raised to check the immigration has failed to curb the flow of people, who for 
centuries have been moving with timber, cloth, cattle and so on (Banerjee, et al 1999). At 
present, we can't expect perfect labor mobility, as it is obvious from the experience of 
EU—where the mobility of labor at the beginning was less than one third of what it is 
today. Similar to the EU, labor mobility may initially be hampered by cultural and 
linguistic differences. Unlike the EU, where the fences created by wars were already 
mended before progressing towards a common currency, the continuing conflict between 
India and Pakistan poses a deeper problem for South Asia.  Nevertheless, the 
governments of all these countries need to push for more official mobility of labor.    20
One way to build trust and harmony between the two nuclear-neighbors is to 
allow nationals to travel across the borders. There had been numerous attempts by the 
Vajpayee government to encourage travel between India and Pakistan by land (bus and 
train) and air. The bus service was launched in 1999 when Prime Minister Vajpayee 
traveled to Lahore for talks with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. More recently, 
visit visas have been granted to members from divided families who live on either side of 
the border. As the dialogue between the two countries progresses (with a very recent visit 
by President Musharraf to India), it will lead to discussions on easing restrictions on 
tourist visas. Unlike the failed summit in 2001, the recent talks between the two countries 
are expected to soften the talk on Kashmir and encourage trade and travel.  The most 
significant of those steps came at the beginning of April 2005, when bus passengers from 
India and Pakistan crossed the front line dividing Kashmir for the first time since 
partition in 1947.
19 Such interactions between the two nations augur well for the entire 
region. 
 
CRITERION 4: FISCAL TRANSFERS 
While no official fiscal transfer mechanism exists at present (except in the form of 
official aid), this issue can be addressed when formal negotiations for adoption of 
common currency start. However, Eichengreen (1997) presents counter-arguments to 
fiscal federalism—it may discourage factor mobility and may encourage national labor 
unions to demand higher wages as the burden of unemployment benefits falls on the 
entire union (and this may create more socially inefficient unemployment). Euro area 
                                                           
19 LA Times, April 17, 2005.    21
collects a union-wide VAT, which is distributed according to some agreed upon rules. 
SAARC countries could build a federal budget on the line of the EU. 
 
CRITERION 5: GEO-POLITICAL FACTORS
20 
While the economic criteria discussed above are essential for determining the 
suitability of South Asia for a monetary union, the geo-political factors play an equally 
important role in this process. Two developments in the international environment make 
the prospects of South Asian exports to the new markets less promising. First, the weak 
growth in the world economy since 2000 has adversely affected the export performance 
of the region. Second, with the formation of regional economic blocs and growing 
protectionism in both the developed and developing regions, the South Asian countries 
may find it difficult to gain access to these markets. Given these developments, it will be 
beneficial for the SAARC countries to focus on intra-regional cooperation.  
Dash (1996) recognizes four reasons for low intra-regional investment and trade 
among the South Asian economies – namely, production of similar products and hence 
being competitors, high tariff and non-tariff barriers, infrastructural bottlenecks and lack 
of political willingness.
21 However, there are compelling economic reasons to suggest 
that it is in the interest of all the South Asian countries to promote intra-regional trade 
and economic cooperation. Direct trade in products like steel and aluminum, textile 
machinery, chemical products, and dry fruits currently being diverted through third 
countries can benefit both India and Pakistan quite substantially in terms of price, quality, 
                                                           
20 This section is taken from Saxena and Baig (2004).  
21 The barriers to trade and political unwillingness seem to be the sticking points. However, the discussion 
in this section shows how enhancing trade would be beneficial to all the countries. Of course, the paper has 
consistently argued that the major benefit from this union will come from peace between India and 
Pakistan. The paper has also offered instances of recent political engagement between the two countries.     22
and time. The region can expand trade in such products as tea and coffee, cotton and 
textiles, natural rubber, light engineering goods, iron and steel, medical equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, and agro-chemicals.  
The energy problems in the region can be solved through cooperation. For 
example, Dash (1996) argues that the water from the Himalayan Rivers flowing through 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Pakistan can be harnessed for flood prevention and 
inland navigation system. India assisted Bhutan in constructing the Chukha hydroelectric 
project, which has the potential to benefit Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan. 
There are significant complementarities in trade among these countries. For 
example, Dash (1996) recognizes that Bangladesh can export such items as tea, 
newsprint, jute goods, and leather to Pakistan and in turn, import such items as textiles, 
cement, light engineering goods, machinery, and railway rolling stock. He identifies that 
India can provide security and meet Bangladesh’s need for manufactured goods, such as 
steel, chemicals, light engineering goods, capital goods, coal and limestone. For a balance 
in trade deficit, India can import products such as urea, sponge iron, semi-processed 
leather, and newsprint from Bangladesh. The need to improve economic ties for 
Bangladesh with India and other countries in South Asia has increased in recent years, 
given the drying up of official development aid (ODA) to the South Asia from 
international agencies. In fact, India has been showing considerable interest in expanding 
economic cooperation with Bangladesh.  
Nepal has always maintained very cordial relations with her neighbors, which 
won her the unanimous support for setting up SAARC’s permanent secretariat in 
Kathmandu. However, she depends on India for aid, some critical imports like oil, 
cement, and coal and for employing her labor. Like Bangladesh, Nepal is facing reduced   23
official foreign aid. Hence, she wants to develop more integration with the other South 
Asian economies, while trying to decrease her economic dependence on India. 
Sri Lanka is an island and the only SAARC nation that does not have a 
contiguous border with India. Her anxiety about more economic cooperation reflects the 
overwhelming economic and political power that India exerts in the region. However, Sri 
Lanka can gain by diverting her trade in cement and ship building with South Korea to 
India and Pakistan. Adverse terms of trade, protectionism from the West and political 
instability from the civil war have led Sri Lanka to build local ties. Hence, since 1992, Sri 
Lanka has consistently advocated improving intraregional trade through the framework of 
South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA). The bilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA) with India is a welcoming step in this direction.  
Among the SAARC countries, India has the broad industrial base and expertise, 
technology, and capital in certain sectors to invest and set up joint ventures in the region. 
Indian companies have emerged as major sources of investment in Sri Lanka and Nepal, 
the countries having bilateral free trade arrangements with India. 
Like all the other SAARC nations and developing countries, Pakistan also has 
limited access to the markets in the developed world and hence Pakistan has taken 
initiatives to form Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) to promote its exports and 
improve intra-regional trade with Central Asia. But given the competition from 
developed countries, it will be difficult for Pakistan to capture these markets. So, Pakistan 
has a lot to gain by accessing the South Asian markets, where the potential for trade is 
immense.   
Of all the SAARC economies, the two smallest countries, Bhutan and Maldives, 
have always supported the growth of regional cooperation in South Asia.   24
From the above discussion, it is evident that there is a great deal of potential in the 
region for developing trade and economic cooperation. Increasing openness of the 
economies with the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and elimination of exchange 
rate risk will enhance trade and facilitate monetary cooperation in the region.  
 
COMPARISON OF SAARC WITH EURO AREA AND ASEAN  
ASEAN does not contain the same type of focal point that Germany, as the largest 
economy in Europe with an established track record of stable macroeconomic policies, 
provided in Europe (Bayoumi and Mauro 1999). India could provide that “focal” point in 
SAARC, as it is the largest economy (both in terms of population and income).
22 All 
countries trade significantly with India (formally or informally)
23 and labor is mobile 
across most of the Indian borders. However, India has not provided a coordination role in 
monetary policy as Bundesbank had done in Europe. Prior to monetary union, many of 
the European countries pegged their currencies to the Deutsche mark. Bhutan and Nepal 
have pegged their currencies to the Indian Rupee since the 1950s, and this has 
encouraged them to trade significantly with India. Formal coordination after monetary 
union would require setting up joint institutions, including a common central bank, 
agreeing on rules for sharing seignorage among member countries, and jointly adopting 
procedures for lender-of-last-resort operation. Khan (1999) also argues that SAARC 
                                                           
22 Thanks are due to a referee who asked if there ever has been a currency area as imbalanced in size of the 
players as would be South Asia. Indeed, in 1974, a formal monetary agreement was signed between South 
Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho, known as the Rand Monetary Area agreement, and the rand has remained 
legal tender in all these countries. South Africa wielded as much economic and political power as India 
does in the case of South Asia. The rand area continued as such until 1992, when Namibia decided to join 
the union. Other examples of such unions can be found in Glick and Rose (2001).  
 
23 See Taneja (2001).   25
needs to establish regional institutions, such as the South Asian Development Bank and a 
Council of Economic Advisors.  
At the eve of adoption of the Euro, capital mobility was very high. ASEAN 
already has high capital mobility. In contrast, SAARC economies are very closed and 
have a long way to go to fulfill the “one-market” ideology that EU adopted. However, 
such liberalization cannot be ruled out. Once trade becomes free across national 
borders—there are bilateral agreements between India and other SAARC countries, with 
the exception of Pakistan—steps could be undertaken for liberalizing capital flows. 
Western Europe is less diverse than ASEAN in terms of levels of economic 
development and monetary systems. Economic similarity may make adoption of policies 
to support economic integration easier, such as the integration of capital and labor 
markets and transfers to the EU’s poorer members. While the migration of workers from 
low-wage to high-wage countries within the EU, and any ensuing social strains, have 
been relatively limited (Bayoumi and Mauro (1999)), the integration of Eastern Europe 
with the EU has already been more complicated. In case of SAARC, while countries are 
at low levels of development, they are on a path of similar growth and development. With 
concerted effort towards coordination, these countries could achieve some agreed upon 
convergence criteria reasonably well.  
While adoption of a common currency leads to economic integration, the same 
level of integration could also be achieved through policy coordination—like between 
Canada and the United States or Switzerland and Germany. However, movement to a 
common currency is a political commitment to ensuring regional integration, hence it 
might be desirable in the SAARC region (where political incentives have outweighed   26




This paper is a modest attempt to answer a policy question: Is SAARC an optimal 
currency area? While the evidence is mixed as one would expect since no formal 
coordination process has taken place, the paper shows that there can be substantial gains 
from monetary union in the form of higher formal trade and peace and stability. The 
analysis in the paper doesn’t suggest that all the seven countries are ready to adopt a 
common currency. Rather, the paper shows the existence of some positive aspects (like 
positive shocks across major economies) and the prospects of increasing trade, which 
would be very beneficial for the region, as access to the world markets may get limited in 
the future.    
While intra-regional trade is small for most countries, except Bhutan, Nepal and 
Maldives, it has increased for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in the last decade and trade is 
likely to increase further once countries move to free trade agreements (as preferential 
and free trade agreements have already been in place between India and Sri Lanka and 
India and Bangladesh).
24 Moreover, Frankel and Rose (1996, 1997) show trade is an 
endogenous variable, and countries are more likely to satisfy the OCA criteria ex-post, 
than  ex-ante. The elimination of exchange rate risks and volatility would decrease 
transaction costs and uncertainty, which is likely to increase trade among these countries. 
                                                           
24 Trade between India and Bhutan and India and Nepal is free. See South Asia Development and 
Cooperation Report 2001/2 (2002) for the potential benefits from trade between India and Pakistan and 
measures undertaken by South Asian nations to encourage trade links.     27
In fact, the paper spells out the commodities in which bilateral trade would be mutually 
beneficial.  
The Herfindahl index indicates that most economies are specialized in their 
production. Since most of these economies specialize in the production of textiles, 
garments and cotton fabrics, it suggests that these economies may experience similar 
shocks and may need similar policy response to offset them. Hence, the loss of policy 
autonomy might be minimal. Instead of engaging in inter-industry trade, these countries 
are more likely to develop intra-industry trade.  
The supply and demand shocks estimated through structural VAR suggest that 
about 50% of the supply shocks (including India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and 80% of the 
demand shocks are positive. The size of both kinds of shocks is small, indicating that the 
shocks may not have very disruptive effects. The speed of adjustment to both kinds of 
shocks is very fast and most of the adjustment takes place within two years. Hence, the 
loss of policy autonomy would impose a low cost in the SAARC region if these countries 
choose to adopt a common currency.  
While labor mobility varies across borders, India already receives a large number 
of immigrants from neighboring countries (mainly illegal migrants). However, recently 
there has been a political move to encourage mobility of tourists between India and 
Pakistan. This will likely build trust and harmony between the two neighbors, which 
bodes well for the entire region. The issue of fiscal transfers is one that needs to be 
addressed once negotiations for common currency begin.  
Regardless of how many criteria for an OCA the SAARC region satisfies, the 
“Lucas Critique” emphasizes that once the regime changes, the parameters estimated over 
the historical data may provide a poor guide for future estimates. Rose and Engel (2002)   28
find that members of international currency unions tend to experience more trade, less 
volatile exchange rates and more synchronized business cycles than do countries with 
their own currencies. Since their sample consists mainly of small and/or poor countries, 
fitting the description for most SAARC economies, their results provide optimism about 
the gains from a common currency area in the SAARC region.  
The success of the Euro area and the EU, talks of Latin America to join NAFTA 
to gain access to North American markets, and strengthening of trading regimes through 
APEC in East Asia have provided impetus to more regional cooperation in South Asia.  
We would like to emphasize that in addition to enhancing formal trade, the 
SAARC region is likely to gain more from greater macroeconomic stability that a 
currency union is likely to bring. Stability would encourage savings, investment and 
foreign direct investment. All these are required to raise the standard of living of over a 
billion people in that part of the world.  
Lastly, we believe that, as in Europe, there is a strong political advantage for the 
economic integration of these countries. The constant disruptive battles between India 
and Pakistan (both of which are nuclear powers) are a source of instability for the region 
and fighting terrorism has been an unproductive use of resources for India. Khan (1999) 
argues that the establishment of the SAARC is not a new concept, but is an effort to 
restore the economic union, which had functioned on the India-Pakistan subcontinent 
before independence in 1947. Since the partition of India into India and Pakistan, the 
politics in that region has created a constant climate of tension and mistrust in South 
Asia, which is impeding growth in the region. Trade can be used to enhance political 
reconciliation between the two nations. History has shown how Sino-American trade 
relations have been used to enhance mutual confidence between two politically hostile   29
nations (South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2001/2 (2002)). Khan (1999) 
argues that “it is widely believed that SAARC will eventually become a vehicle of 
confidence building and economic development in South Asia.”
25  
With cooperation already in place and progressing in terms of trade, social issues, 
regional investment promotion, WTO issues, tourism, tea council, steel front, promotion 
of internet, finance and network of SAARC researchers, we can foresee the benefits of 
greater economic integration through coordination of macroeconomic policies. Two 
reports (Tripartite SAARC Expert Group set up by the Committee on Economic 
Cooperation in 1997 and the Report of the SAARC Group of Eminent Persons 
established by the 9
th SAARC Summit in Male in 1997) have recommended the gradual 
formation of a South Asian Economic Union by 2020. The Association should establish a 
Free Trade Area by 2008-10, a South Asian Custom Union by 2015 and a South Asian 
Economic Union by 2020.   
Once these countries can give up their political motives and start to think of 
themselves as a part of a prestigious economic union, it could help bring peace and 
stability. Such an environment is crucial and would be conducive to growth in that 
region. Needless to say, the improvement in the welfare of a billion plus population in 
that region would be tremendous! 
 
 
                                                           
25 Interested readers are referred to Khan (1999) for a review on how specifically countries can gain from 
economic integration.    30




Origin and History: 
 
  The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) comprises 
seven countries of South Asia – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. The idea of regional cooperation in South Asia was first rooted around 
November 1980. After consultations, the foreign secretaries of the seven countries met 
for the first time in Colombo in April 1981. This was followed by a meeting of the 
Committee of the Whole, which identified five broad areas for regional cooperation.  
  The foreign ministers of South Asia, at their first meeting in New Delhi in August 
1983, adopted the Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) and 
formally launched the Integrated Program of Action (IPA) initially in five agreed areas of 
cooperation—agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, and, 
health and population activities.  
  The heads of state or government at their first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka on 
7
th and 8
th December 1985 adopted the Charter formally establishing the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation.  
 
Institutional Setup: 
•  Summit – The highest authority of the Association rests with the heads of state or 
government, who meet annually at the Summit level. To date, eleven meetings of 
the heads of state or government have been held respectively in Dhaka (1985), 
Bangalore (1986), Kathmandu (1987), Islamabad (1988), Male (1990), Colombo 
(1991), Dhaka (1993), New Delhi (1995), Male (1997), Colombo (1998), and 
Kathmandu (2002). The Twelfth SAARC Summit is scheduled to be held in 
Pakistan. 
•   Council of Ministers – Comprising the foreign ministers of member states, the 
Council is responsible for formulating policies, reviewing progress, deciding on 
new areas of cooperation, establishing additional mechanisms as deemed 
necessary, and, deciding on matters of general interest to the Association. The 
Council is expected to meet twice a year and may also meet in extraordinary 
session by agreement of member states. It has held twenty-two regular sessions.  
•  Standing Committee – The Standing Committee comprising the foreign 
secretaries of member states is entrusted with the task of overall monitoring and 
coordination of programs. The Committee has held twenty-seven regular sessions 
and three special sessions, the latest in Colombo in August 2001. The twenty-
eight session of the Committee will be held in Kathmandu. 




•  Committee on Economic Cooperation – In July 1991, the Council of Ministers 
at their Ninth session in Male established the Committee on Economic 
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Cooperation (CEC) comprising Commerce/Trade secretaries of the SAARC 
member states. The function of the CEC was to formulate and oversee 
implementation of specific programs within the SAARC framework to strengthen 
intra-regional cooperation in economic relations. So far, the CEC has held ten 
meetings.  
•  Meetings of Commerce Ministers - The first meeting of SAARC Commerce 
ministers was held in New Delhi in January 1996. Since then, two more meetings 
of Commerce ministers have been held which focused on enlarging the scope and 
coverage of regional economic cooperation. Meetings of Commerce ministers 
have also taken place on WTO issues.  
•  SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) – The Tenth Summit in 
Colombo approved the formulation on an institutional framework for trade 
liberalization in SAARC through SAPTA. IN 1993, the framework agreement on 
SAPTA was finalized and signed at the Seventh Summit at Dhaka. It entered into 
force in 1993. So far three rounds of trade negotiations have been concluded 
under SAPTA covering over 5000 commodities.  
•  South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) – The Tenth Summit in Colombo in 
1998 decided on the setting up of a Committee of Experts which would draft a 
comprehensive treaty regime for creating a free trade area within the region. The 
Committee has been set up and a draft prepared by the Secretariat is under 
consideration. 
 
(Source: www.saarc-sec.org/)  32
Appendix 2: Data Sources 
 
For correlation coefficients of growth and inflation and Structural VAR: (1970-2003) 
 
Growth: Real Gross Domestic Product: GDP Volume; 2000=100; IFS line 99BVPZF 
Inflation: IFS line 64..XZF 
CPI: IFS line 64…ZF; except Bangladesh’s CPI was spliced with the data from United 
Nations Statistical Office. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics; Published: [Lake 
Success, N.Y.: The Office, 1947-) and  
GDP deflator: IFS: 99BIPZF 
 
For Openness Index: 
Exports: IFS line 70 
Imports: IFS line 71 
GDP  : IFS line 99B..ZF 
 
For Herfindahl Index: 
 
Data on one-digit SITC codes for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka was 
obtained from United Nations Foreign Trade Statistics of Asia and the Pacific.  
 
For Structural VARs: 
 
 
Sample Size for Structural VAR estimation: 
 
Country  Sample Size  No. of Observations 
Bangladesh 1977—2003  27 
Bhutan 1983—2000  18 
India 1973—2003    31 
Maldives 1980—2003  24 
Nepal 1973—2003  31 
Pakistan 1973—2003  31 
Sri Lanka  1973—2003  31 
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Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri  Lanka
GDP Growth 5.9 7.0 4.0 4.6 6.2 4.2 6.0
GDP per capita (PPP $) 1540 n.a. 2730 n.a. 1280 1870 3400
Value Added: Agriculture (% of GDP) 1/ 24.6 33.2 24.9 11.2 40.7 26.7 19.5
Value Added: Industry (% of GDP) 24.4 37.3 26.9 n.a. 22.1 23.1 27.5
Value Added: Manufacturing (% of GDP) 1/ 14.7 10.2 15.8 4.4 9.4 15.3 16.9
Infant Mortality rate 54.0 57.6 68.0 59.0 72.0 85.0 17.0
Life expectancy at birth 61.2 62.2 62.8 68.3 58.9 63.0 73.0
Health Expenditures (% of GDP) 2.4 0.4 4.0 1.3 n.a. 3.2 1.8
Illiteracy rate (youth) 51.6 n.a. 27.4 0.9 39.6 43.0 3.2
Immunization Measles (% below 12 months) 76.0 76.0 56.0 99.0 71.0 54.0 99.0
Population (0-14) (% of total) 37.8 43.0 33.5 42.0 41.0 41.7 26.3
Population (15-64) (% of total) 59.0 52.9 61.5 54.0 55.2 55.0 67.4
Population >65 (% of total) 3.2 4.1 5.0 4.0 3.7 3.3 6.3
Rural population (% of total) 75.0 92.9 72.3 72.4 88.2 66.9 77.2
Population density (per sq. km) 1006.8 17.1 341.7 913.3 161.1 179.1 285.7
CPI Inflation (average 1991-2000) 5.2 9.8 9.1 7.5 8.9 9.2 9.7
Budget balance (% of GDP) 2/ -2.8 -3.5 -5.2 -4.6 -3.3 -5.5 -9.5
Official Exchange rate (prd avg US$) 52.1 44.9 44.9 11.8 71.1 53.6 77.0
Current Account (% of GDP) -1.3 -26.0 -0.6 -8.9 2.9 -2.0 -6.4
Trade (% of GDP) 33.3 89.5 30.5 168.7 55.7 34.3 90.2
External Balance (% GDP) -5.2 -30.2 -2.6 19.6 -9.1 -1.6 -10.8
External Debt (% of GDP) 33.3 41.7 21.7 34.5 51.5 54.0 55.3
ST debt (% of external debt) 1.9 0.5 3.5 10.4 0.9 4.6 7.7
FDI (% of GDP) 0.6 0.0 0.5 2.2 0.0 0.5 1.1
International Reserves (months of imports) 1.9 12.1 6.0 3.0 6.1 1.8 1.5
Source: World Development Indicator, World Bank
1/ Shaded figures for Maldives are for the year 1998
2/ Shaded figure for Bangladesh is for the year 1999
Table 1: Economic Structure of the SAARC Countries; 2000
GROWTH AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
SOCIAL INDICATORS
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Country Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Austria 0.034 0.020 0.045 0.018
Belgium 0.032 0.021 0.051 0.024
Denmark 0.027 0.023 0.072 0.024
Finland 0.037 0.023 0.081 0.036
France 0.034 0.017 0.068 0.031
Germany 0.029 0.022 0.039 0.016
Ireland 0.040 0.022 0.086 0.052
Italy 0.036 0.023 0.098 0.053
Netherlands 0.032 0.022 0.051 0.028
Norway 0.037 0.018 0.065 0.033
Portugal 0.044 0.033 0.122 0.072
Spain 0.041 0.026 0.102 0.043
Sweden 0.027 0.018 0.072 0.026
Switzerland 0.024 0.026 0.044 0.022
United Kingdom 0.024 0.021 0.081 0.051
Average 0.033 0.022 0.072 0.035
Australia 0.031 0.019 0.094 0.029
Hong Kong 0.080 0.046 0.085 0.038
Indonesia 0.062 0.023 0.147 0.103
Japan 0.043 0.020 0.045 0.047
Korea 0.085 0.038 0.122 0.078
Malaysia 0.066 0.033 0.046 0.060
New Zealand 0.025 0.042 0.086 0.059
Philippines 0.037 0.045 0.127 0.091
Singapore 0.075 0.034 0.042 0.044
Taiwan 0.083 0.035 0.066 0.070
Thailand 0.070 0.031 0.067 0.051
Average 0.060 0.033 0.084 0.061
Argentina 0.006 0.043 1.184 0.771
Bolivia 0.016 0.038 0.746 1.194
Brazil 0.051 0.048 0.809 0.661
Canada 0.038 0.023 0.067 0.031
Chile 0.023 0.075 0.581 0.610
Columbia 0.043 0.020 0.211 0.034
Ecuador 0.056 0.069 0.217 0.148
Mexico 0.040 0.041 0.340 0.233
Paraguay 0.058 0.045 0.165 0.076
Peru 0.015 0.065 0.697 0.776
United States 0.028 0.025 0.058 0.024
Uruguay 0.016 0.045 0.476 0.127
Venezuela 0.015 0.043 0.159 0.156
Average 0.031 0.045 0.439 0.372
Bangladesh 0.048 0.025 0.059 0.077
Bhutan 0.067 0.034 0.087 0.039
India 0.049 0.030 0.082 0.056
Maldives 0.094 0.056 0.094 0.170
Nepal 0.037 0.030 0.087 0.053
Pakistan 0.049 0.022 0.089 0.055
Sri Lanka 0.044 0.020 0.102 0.055
Average 0.055 0.031 0.086 0.072
Note: Statistics for Western Europe, East Asia and The Americas is
from Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) Table 1 (1960-90); Statistics for 
South Asia are author's calculations, period 1970-2003 or within,




Table 2: Basic Statistics of Different Geographic Regions
Growth Inflation
Western Europe
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BGD BTN IND LKA MDV NPL PAK
Bangladesh 1.00
Bhutan 0.30 1.00
India -0.32 -0.10 1.00
Sri Lanka -0.03 -0.19 0.04 1.00
Maldives 0.27 -0.16 -0.25 0.13 1.00
Nepal 0.22 -0.33 0.04 0.10 -0.12 1.00
Pakistan -0.14 -0.06 0.26 0.23 0.09 0.05 1.00
BGD BTN IND LKA MDV NPL PAK
Bangladesh 1.00
Bhutan 0.16 1.00
India 0.66 0.73 1.00
Sri Lanka 0.37 0.40 0.40 1.00
Maldives 0.37 0.12 0.12 0.06 1.00
Nepal 0.49 0.69 0.73 0.30 0.23 1.00
Pakistan -0.18 0.40 0.67 0.19 0.05 0.37 1.00
BGD BTN IND LKA MDV NPL PAK
Bangladesh 1.00
Bhutan -0.34 1.00
India -0.06 -0.25 1.00
Sri Lanka 0.27 -0.24 0.45 1.00
Maldives 0.02 -0.20 0.33 0.55 1.00
Nepal 0.75 -0.21 0.04 0.02 0.15 1.00
Pakistan 0.47 0.31 0.20 0.42 0.24 0.30 1.00
Table 3c: Pairwise Correlations of Inflation (GDP deflator) across SAARC countries: 1971-2003
Table 3a: Pairwise Correlations of Growth across SAARC Countries: 1971-2003
Table 3b: Pairwise Correlations of Inflation (CPI) across SAARC Countries: 1970-2003
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OBS BGD BTN IND LKA NPL PAK
1975 15.9 n.a. 11.4 36.0 18.0 28.6
1980 26.2 47.3 13.5 77.0 21.7 33.7
1985 24.4 54.9 11.8 53.2 24.0 29.1
1990 18.2 53.1 12.8 57.3 24.9 33.0
1995 25.5 69.5 17.9 69.1 39.7 33.0
2000 28.9 63.2 20.2 72.0 44.5 33.6
2003 28.6 n.a. 21.5 64.7 40.4 35.9
Note: Openness = 100*(exports + imports)/ GDP; comparable data for Maldives is not available





1985 1990 1995 2000
Bangladesh 4.65 5.83 12.82 7.85
India 1.55 1.41 2.68 2.47
Maldives 12.46 12.02 14.25 22.06
Nepal 34.27 10.24 14.85 34.78
Pakistan 2.76 2.65 2.16 2.68
Sri Lanka 5.51 5.60 7.80 7.38
Note: These figures represent trade of a SAARC nation with other
SAARC countries in total trade; 100*(trade with SAARC)/Total Trade
Source: Author's calculations from Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbook, IMF, various issues
Table 4b: Intra-SAARC Trade
 
 






Sri Lanka 1/ 0.29 0.04
SAARC 0.31 0.06
Non-currency union members 2/ 0.23 0.24
Currency union members 2/ 0.31 0.19
1/ Sample for Sri Lanka is 1981-1994
2/ Figures taken from Rose and Engel (2002)
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% of exports









India Textile goods 27.6
Gem and jewellery 22.4
Engineering goods (inc software) 14.7
Chemicals 11.2







Pakistan Cotton fabrics 14.0




Sri Lanka Textiles and garments 52.7
Tea 13.5
Diamond and jewellery 3.3
Coconut products 2.8
Petroleum products 1.6
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Table 6: Major Exports of SAARC Countries; 1999
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B G DB T N I N DL K A M D V N P LP A K
Bangladesh 1.00
Bhutan -0.01 1.00
India -0.15 -0.02 1.00
Sri Lanka -0.03 -0.20 -0.04 1.00
Maldives -0.41 0.29 -0.06 0.12 1.00
Nepal 0.24 -0.03 0.12 -0.12 -0.20 1.00
Pakistan -0.37 -0.15 0.07 0.03 0.11 -0.06 1.00
B G DB T N I N DL K A M D V N P LP A K
Bangladesh 1.00
Bhutan 0.33 1.00
India -0.68 -0.60 1.00
Sri Lanka -0.28 0.67 0.18 1.00
Maldives -0.44 -0.53 0.42 0.53 1.00
Nepal 0.36 -0.62 0.06 -0.30 0.14 1.00
Pakistan -0.28 -0.35 0.73 0.08 -0.05 -0.06 1.00
B G DB T N I N DL K A M D V N P LP A K
Bangladesh 1.00
Bhutan 0.29 1.00
India 0.03 0.31 1.00
Sri Lanka -0.13 0.07 0.18 1.00
Maldives -0.30 -0.29 -0.04 0.08 1.00
Nepal 0.11 0.53 0.57 0.34 0.18 1.00
Pakistan 0.22 0.37 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.46 1.00
Table 7a: Pairwise Correlations of Supply Shocks across SAARC Countries: 1973-03
Table 7c: Pairwise Correlations of Demand shocks across SAARC Countries: 1973-2003
Table 7b: Pairwise Correlations of Supply Shocks across SAARC Countries: 1995-03
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Size Adjustment Speed Size Adjustment Speed
Bangladesh 0.008 0.741 0.028 1.195
Bhutan 0.023 0.727 0.033 1.532
India 0.025 0.913 0.040 1.411
Maldives 0.036 1.053 0.047 0.512
Nepal 0.016 0.888 0.034 1.138
Pakistan 0.028 0.612 0.040 0.990
Sri Lanka 0.023 0.847 0.038 0.968
Average 0.023 0.826 0.037 1.106
Austria 0.018 0.999 0.017 0.415
Belgium 0.028 0.668 0.020 0.508
Denmark 0.022 1.104 0.017 0.135
Finland 0.018 0.875 0.027 0.684
France 0.034 0.243 0.014 0.101
Germany 0.022 1.193 0.015 0.659
Ireland 0.021 1.222 0.038 0.382
Italy 0.030 0.427 0.036 0.380
Netherlands 0.033 0.692 0.019 0.511
Noway 0.031 0.651 0.034 0.704
Portugal 0.061 0.426 0.026 0.367
Spain 0.057 0.083 0.015 0.123
Sweden 0.030 0.261 0.012 0.419
Switzerland 0.031 0.997 0.016 0.858
United Kingdo 0.018 0.425 0.019 0.016
Average 0.030 0.684 0.022 0.417
Australia 0.011 0.925 0.017 0.910
Hong Kong 0.023 1.590 0.044 1.190
Indonesia 0.013 1.239 0.071 1.335
Japan 0.012 1.667 0.017 0.270
Korea 0.029 0.886 0.038 0.115
Malaysia 0.032 1.038 0.063 1.607
New Zealand 0.060 0.648 0.031 0.291
Philippines 0.089 0.587 0.081 1.475
Singapore 0.032 1.353 0.028 1.072
Taiwan 0.021 1.466 0.049 0.673
Thailand 0.026 1.381 0.042 1.279
Average 0.032 1.162 0.044 0.929
Argentina 0.033 1.141 0.438 1.126
Bolivia 0.069 0.585 0.636 1.302
Brazil 0.084 0.706 0.068 0.983
Canada 0.020 1.052 0.028 0.703
Chile 0.064 1.214 0.251 0.548
Colombia 0.026 0.823 0.027 0.720
Ecuador 0.162 0.402 0.076 0.987
Mexico 0.059 0.775 0.072 0.865
Paraguay 0.094 0.459 0.064 0.719
Peru 0.050 1.169 0.062 0.452
United States 0.028 0.269 0.015 0.078
Uruguay 0.049 1.014 0.074 1.227
Venezuela 0.062 0.810 0.074 0.949
Average 0.062 0.801 0.145 0.820
Note: Figures for Western Europe, East Asia and The Americas is from 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), SAARC figures are author's calculations
Supply Disturbances Demand Disturbances
Table 8: Disturbances and Adjustment Across Different
Geographic Regions
SAARC
Western Europe
East Asia
The Americas
 